![]() ![]() ![]() #COMPANY WIDE SAFEINCLOUD PASSWORD#While some desktop password managers correctly achieve P1 and P2 , many have incorrect implementations that allow attackers to steal or phish users’ credentials , and none can fully implement P3 due to technical limitations of browser extension APIs . On desktop environments, password managers are primarily implemented as ad-hoc browser extensions-i.e., the extension individually implements all aspects of the autofill process without support from OS or browser autofill frameworks. To secure autofill, password managers must only fill credentials when: ( P1) the user has explicitly authorized the fill operation , ( P2) the credential is mapped to the web domain or app to be filled , and ( P3) the filled credential will only be accessible to the mapped app or web domain. . On the other hand, if implemented incorrectly, password managers can become a single point of failure, putting all a user's credentials at risk . Password managers offer a pathway to help users more effectively manage their passwords, assisting users to create strong passwords, store those passwords, and finally fill those passwords into login forms (i.e., password autofill), significantly reducing the cognitive burden of using strong, unique passwords . While other authentication schemes have been proposed, passwords remain dominant . These insecure behaviors make targeted attacks easier and lead to large-scale account compromise when data breaches occur. The cognitive burden of remembering many strong, unique passwords leads users to create easily guessed passwords and to reuse passwords . We conclude the paper with recommendations for the design and implementation of secure autofill frameworks. Our results demonstrate the need for significant improvements to mobile autofill frameworks. We also demonstrate how these frameworks act as a confused deputy in manager-assisted credential phishing attacks. Our results find that while the frameworks address several common issues, they also enforce insecure behavior and fail to provide password managers sufficient information to override the frameworks’ insecure behavior, resulting in mobile managers being less secure than their desktop counterparts overall. In this paper, we evaluate mobile autofill frameworks on iOS and Android, examining whether they achieve substantive benefits over the ad-hoc desktop environment or become a problematic single point of failure. In contrast to desktop systems where password managers receive no system-level support, mobile operating systems provide autofill frameworks designed to integrate with password managers to provide secure and usable autofill for browsers and other apps installed on mobile devices. Password managers help users more effectively manage their passwords, encouraging them to adopt stronger passwords across their many accounts. ![]()
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